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Abstract 
 
 
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum entanglement experiments is at best 
incomplete, since the intermediate state induced by collapse of the wave function 
apparently depends upon the inertial rest frame in which the experiment is observed.  
While Everett’s Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) avoids the issue of wave function 
collapse, it, too, is a casualty of the special theory of relativity.  This requires all 
events in the universe, past, present and future, to be unique, as in the block-universe 
picture, which rules out Everett-style branching.  The benefits of MWI may be 
retained, however, by postulating a multiverse of discrete, parallel, block universes 
which are identical to each other up to certain points in the MWI “trunk” before they 
diverge according to the MWI branching.  The quantum probability of an event then 
emerges from the number of parallel universes in which the event happens divided by 
the total number of universes.  This means that the total number of such universes is 
finite.  Such a picture is more easily envisaged by thinking of it as a purely 
mathematical structure, as in Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis.  
However, while Tegmark wished to avoid contamination from Gödelian self-
referential knots, not only does such contamination appear to be inevitable, it brings 
an unexpected benefit.  The mathematical hierarchy required by Gödel’s enigmatic 
footnote 48a leads to an explanation for a unitary evolution of deterministic quantum 
rules across the multiverse while accounting for quantum uncertainty within an 
individual universe.  Other aspects of this structure, called here the Plexus, are 
discussed, including awareness of existence and other questions raised by the 
hypothesis. 
 
 
1. Collapse of the wave function 
 
Nearly a century after Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg separately wrote down their 
understanding of the elements of quantum mechanics, controversy over the 
Copenhagen interpretation is still very much alive: a quick arXiv search reveals a 
remarkable number of papers still debating the issue.  Although there is no definitive 
list of Copenhagen principles, a consensus evolved from the 1950s which generally 
included effective collapse of the wave function with overtones of non-locality.  It is 
the collapse aspect that raises difficulty. 
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Consider, for instance, the spins of a pair of electrons, entangled in a singlet state, 
measured respectively by Alice and Bob.  The electrons travel in opposite directions 
at equal speeds from a source that is closer to Alice than to Bob (see Figure 1).  They 
each orientate their spin filter at a randomly chosen angle “at the last moment” (so 
that it is too late for information about the respective angles of inclination to be 
swapped between them before the electrons arrive at the filters: their measurements 
are separated by a space-like interval so that the experiment is non-local).  We 
suppose that Alice chooses to orientate her filter vertically at 0° and that Bob chooses 
an angle of 120° for his filter. 
 
Copenhagen interpretation (observed 
in Alice’s and Bob’s reference frame: 
Alice makes first measurement)
Alice measures spin on her 
electron, thus “collapsing”
spin on Bob’s electron        
to 180°
Probability that 
Bob measures 
spin 120° with 
spin filter at 
120° = ¾
Source of entangled 
pair of electrons
Probability 
that Alice 
measures 
spin 0° = ½
Combined probability that 
Alice measures 0° and Bob 
measures 120° = ⅜
Spin 
filter
 
 
 
Figure 1: In this reference frame, the source of the pair of electrons is closer to 
Alice than to Bob and so she makes the first measurement. 
 
 
Alice makes the first measurement, the source of electrons being closer to her.  The 
standard Copenhagen interpretation of the experiment is that there is a probability of 
½ that she will find her electron has a 0° spin, and that the act of measurement 
collapses the wave function, setting the spin of the other electron, heading towards 
Bob, at 180°.  When this electron reaches Bob’s filter, inclined at 120°, the 
probability that Bob will measure a spin of 120° is cos2[(180°-120°)/2] = ¾, so that 
the combined probability that Alice measures 0° and Bob measures 120° is ⅜. 
 
Since the interval between Alice’s and Bob’s measurements is space-like – non-local 
– it is always possible to find a frame of reference in which the order of measurements 
is reversed.  So, in a reference frame travelling sufficiently fast from Alice towards 
Bob, it is Bob, and not Alice, who makes the first measurement (see Figure 2).  The 
Copenhagen view of this is that there is a probability of ½ that Bob will find his 
electron spin orientated at 120° and that the act of measurement collapses Alice’s 
electron (still en route to her) at 300°.  When this electron reaches Alice’s spin filter, 
the probability that Alice will measure 0° is cos2[(360°-300°)/2] = ¾, and, again, the 
combined probability that Alice measures 0° and Bob measures 120° is ⅜. 
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So the Copenhagen process can be used to calculate the combined probability of the 
two measurements on the entangled system, regardless of the frame of reference used 
to make the calculation.  However, collapse produces two pictures that are quite 
different: in the first frame, we have an electron with a spin of 180° heading towards 
Bob and in the second we have an electron with spin 300° heading towards Alice.  
Clearly, both pictures cannot be real.  Since all inertial frames are regarded equally in 
special relativity, there cannot be a favoured frame and so neither picture can be real. 
 
Copenhagen interpretation 
(observed in reference frame 
travelling sufficiently fast 
from Alice to Bob that Bob 
makes first measurement)
Bob measures spin 
on his electron, 
thus “collapsing”
spin on Alice’s 
electron to 300°
Combined probability that 
Alice measures 0° and Bob 
measures 120° = ⅜
Probability that 
Bob measures 
spin 120° = ½
Probability that Alice 
measures spin 0° with 
spin filter at 0° = ¾
 
 
 
Figure 2: In this frame of reference, it is Bob who makes the first measurement. 
 
 
2. Many Worlds Interpretation 
 
Difficulties such as this led to a quest for alternative views, among which Everett’s 
Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) [1] has remained a respectable contender for 
decades [2], [3].  This has the attraction that there is no need for the wave function to 
collapse; instead, we consider the unitary evolution of the wave function of the whole 
universe in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, forever branching into 
orthogonal, non-interfering states.  In many of these branches a version of oneself 
exists, similar or identical to the versions in other branches, and quantum uncertainty 
is manifest, for instance, by an individual version not knowing which branch it 
inhabits.  Many workers have discussed measurement, decoherence and how 
probabilities might be quantified in MWI [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], 
[13], but there is no general consensus. 
 
Figure 3 uses the above entanglement experiment to illustrate some of the features of 
MWI.  Alice and Bob may measure their electron spin to be up or down, represented 
respectively by Au, Ad, Bu and Bd.  (Here, “Bu” means Bob measuring a 120° spin 
when his spin filter is orientated at 120° and “Bd” means him finding a 300° spin.)  
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The upper-left “tree” shows the experiment from Alice’s point of view.  There is a 
time when she has made her measurement but news of Bob’s outcome, carried at the 
speed of light, has not yet reached her, and so the two possibilities are labelled 
“AuB?” and “AdB?”. 
 
½ AuB? ½ AdB?
⅜ AuBu ⅜ AdBd⅛ AuBd ⅛ AdBu
½ A?Bu ½ A?Bd
⅜ AuBu ⅜ AdBd⅛ AdBu ⅛ AuBd
MWI branching from 
Alice’s viewpoint.  “B?”
indicates state where 
there is yet no outcome 
for Bob’s measurement
MWI branching from 
Bob’s viewpoint.  “A?”
indicates state where 
there is yet no outcome 
for Alice’s measurement
Shaded filament 
in either picture 
represents the 
same block 
universe
 
 
Figure 3: The topology of branching in MWI depends upon the viewer, but the 
final outcomes are the same: a probability of ⅜ that both Bob and Alice will find 
an up-spin, a probability of ⅜ that they will both find a down-spin, a probability 
of ⅛ that Alice will find an up-spin while Bob finds a down-spin, and a 
probability of ⅛ that Alice will find a down-spin while Bob finds an up-spin. 
 
 
All four possible outcomes are shown at the top of the tree, and the outcomes are each 
labelled with a fraction to indicate its relative probability.  Each fraction may be 
regarded as the absolute square of the amplitude for that particular outcome.  Notice 
that the thicknesses of the trunk and branches of the tree have been drawn 
proportionally to the relative probabilities.  The tree has been sectioned into equal-
sized filaments to make this easier to see.  The tree to the lower-right shows the same 
experiment from Bob’s viewpoint.  While there is a difference in the topology of the 
branching between the two viewpoints, the final outcomes are the same as may be 
seen, for instance, by comparing the two highlighted filaments in the two trees. 
 
3. Block universe 
 
While issues such as branch thicknesses and topologies invite debate, the branching 
structure of MWI provokes a deeper concern, rooted once again in Einstein’s theory 
of special relativity.  It is the block universe. 
 
Suppose that Bob is at a distance x from Alice, as measured in her reference frame, 
and moves at constant speed, v, towards her and that they each clap their hands at the 
same time in Alice’s reference frame.  These two clapping events are not 
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simultaneous in Bob’s reference frame – according to the Lorentz transformations, 
Alice would have to clap her hands at a later time, vx/c2, for them to be simultaneous 
for Bob.  In other words, for Alice, at the moment she first claps her hands, the time 
interval, vx/c2, while yet in her future, is already in Bob’s past.  This experiment can 
be repeated by other observers at other places and times and in other reference frames 
so that, over an appropriate span of reference frames, all of Alice’s future is already in 
the past.  Since the past cannot be changed, neither can Alice’s future.  This is the 
block-universe view, where all events, past, present and future, are woven into the 
four-dimensional fabric of the spacetime block.  It is remarkable how small an impact 
this astonishing conclusion has made upon general culture1. 
 
But now we have a problem.  Our block universe is incompatible with MWI.  
Although we do not know the outcome of a quantum measurement that we are about 
to make, there are reference frames in our universe in which we have already made 
the measurement and observed the outcome – and so that outcome is unchangeable 
and therefore unique.  There is no branching in a block universe. 
 
4. A multiverse of parallel, block universes 
 
However, there is a way to retain the principal advantage of MWI (viz., it gets round 
the need for wave-function collapse) by using a topologically different structure that 
is nevertheless mathematically equivalent.  We can take each filament of the MWI 
tree, such as the one highlighted in each of the two trees in Figure 3, and regard it as a 
block universe.  So there are as many block universes as there are filaments in the 
tree.  These parallel, stand-alone, block universes do not interact at any point in their 
structures.  Figure 4 shows the block-universe representation of the entanglement 
experiment. 
 
The relative numbers of block universes with different outcomes are determined by 
the absolute squares of the amplitudes for those outcomes.  Notice that only one of the 
eight block universes has Alice detecting spin-up while Bob detects spin-down (right-
most universe in the top row).  This corresponds to the block universe highlighted in 
each of the two trees in Figure 3. 
 
Of course, every measurement or quantum event in the universe occurs against a 
background of a myriad of other such events, and so the eight parallel universes in 
Figure 4 must be multiplied by every group of parallel universes resulting from these 
other events.  Let us call each group of parallel universes corresponding to a particular 
event a “kernel”.  The kernel for the entanglement experiment is shown in Figure 4 as 
                                                 
1 Although, for all his somewhat equivocal attitude to science, and, indeed, occasional disparaging 
remarks about Einstein himself, T S Eliot captures a key aspect of the block universe remarkably well 
in the opening lines of his (admittedly religious and mystical) “Four Quartets”: 
 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
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KAB entangled = (3AuBu + 1AuBd + 1AdBu + 3AdBd).  If Alice and Bob repeat the 
same experiment N times, then the kernel for the combined group of experiments is 
given by 
NKK ⊗= entangledABGroup .  In a series of such experiments in a typical block 
universe, the observed relative proportions of the four possible combinations of Alice 
and Bob finding spin-up or spin-down will more closely approach the proportions in 
the individual kernel as N becomes very large.  In other words, in the majority of 
universes, after many experiments, Alice and Bob will deduce that, for instance, it is 
three times more likely that their spins in an individual experiment will match rather 
than not.  Similarly, the kernel for the combination of all events in a universe is the 
tensor product of the kernels for all of the individual events. 
 
KAB entangled = (3AuBu + 1AuBd + 1AdBu + 3AdBd)
 
Figure 4:  Parallel, block-universe representation of the experiment in Figures 
1-3.  A black square represents an outcome of spin-up and an empty one 
represents spin-down. 
 
 
A property of these individual parallel, block universes is that they are very similar to 
each other at early times (corresponding to positions low on the tree trunk) and that 
differences between them become more marked at later times (corresponding to 
higher levels in the branching). 
 
Implicit in this description of a multiverse of parallel, block universes is that their 
number is finite.  An infinite number would entail the measure problem [14], 
involving probabilities that are ratios of infinities.  This is at variance with MWI, 
where the number of branches at the top of the tree (and, hence, the number of 
filaments running right down to the trunk) may be infinite, and even uncountably so2. 
 
The consequence of requiring that the number of parallel universes in the multiverse 
be finite is that probabilities must always be rational numbers, as in the example in 
                                                 
2 See the curious response of Hugh Everett to a question put to him by Boris Podolsky: “It looks like 
we would have a non-denumerable infinity of worlds”.  To this quite profound statement Everett 
simply utters a laconical “Yes” [15]. 
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Figure 4, where the probability of both Alice and Bob measuring spin-up is ⅜.  
However, the thickness, or weight, of branches in MWI is determined by the 
Schrödinger equation, which gives rise to real, rather than rational, probabilities.  For 
the Schrödinger equation to generate the rational numbers demanded by the parallel, 
block-universe model, it would need to be recast as a digital equation. (See, for 
instance, Gerard ’t Hooft, who outlines an approach to devising a quantum theory 
where, rather than using real numbers for fundamental quantities like position and 
momentum, integers are used instead [16].  See also Ramin Zahedi, who has 
reformulated the field equations of the strong, electromagnetic and gravitational 
forces (and other equations from quantum theory) in terms of integers and matrices: 
he prefaces his paper with a nice review of work in the field [17].) 
 
5. The multiverse is purely a mathematical structure 
 
While MWI has too many branches to be a perfect template for the parallel, block-
universe model, it nevertheless underlines the need to regard the multiverse as a 
purely mathematical structure.  An ultimate description of the universe or the 
multiverse cannot depend upon components (such as fundamental particles) that are 
actually within the universe or multiverse it is trying to describe.  In the final analysis, 
the language of any such description has to be independent of its subject, and 
elemental mathematics (i.e., basic mathematical relations, freed from the symbolism 
used by humankind to express mathematical discoveries) is the natural candidate. 
 
Max Tegmark is the current principal protagonist and populariser of the concept of a 
mathematical universe [18], [19], [20], [21].  His approach is to define a hierarchical 
mathematical structure containing four levels of multiverse.  Our universe, along with 
many others, is embedded in the Level I multiverse, whilst the most general and 
fundamental part of the structure is Level IV.  Tegmark wishes to protect his structure 
from any contamination from Gödelian self-referential knots in the mathematics: 
 
“I have long wondered whether Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in 
some sense torpedoes the MUH [Mathematical Universe 
Hypothesis]” [19] 
 
The resolution, according to Tegmark, is that only mathematical statements that are 
decidable can qualify as components of the mathematical multiverse.  Tegmark calls 
this scheme the Computable Universe Hypothesis.  Gödel statements – undecidable 
propositions – are prohibited in his scheme. 
 
6. Gödel’s enigmatic footnote 48a 
 
However, quantum rules, whether digital or real, rely upon a simple, formal system of 
arithmetical rules (for instance, addition, in the case of superposition of states).  So, 
from this perspective, the mathematical structure containing our universe and 
multiverse has to contain undecidable propositions.  The resolution of these 
undecidable propositions is contained in Gödel’s enigmatic footnote 48a: 
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“The true source of the incompleteness attaching to all formal 
systems of mathematics, is to be found – as will be shown in Part 
II of this essay – in the fact that the formation of ever higher types 
can be continued into the transfinite…” [22] 
 
In other words (I shall return to the “transfinite” term in a moment), in any 
sufficiently complex system, there are undecidable propositions that can be decided at 
higher levels which incorporate new axioms from which the propositions now follow 
either immediately or through theorems incorporating the lower axioms.  Alfred 
Tarski came to the same understanding independently of Gödel four years later: 
 
“All sentences constructed according to Gödel’s method possess 
the property that it can be established whether they are true or false 
on the basis of the metatheory of higher order having a correct 
definition of truth.” [23] 
 
To put that prosaically in terms of our own block universe, events will occur (such as 
the discovery that the orientation of an electron is spin-up) which cannot be predicted  
with certainty from anything within the block universe itself, but which follow 
logically from appropriate rules within a higher system.  So the unitary, deterministic 
quantum rules may be regarded as axioms of the multiverse: from the viewpoint of the 
multiverse, events in specific individual universes are uniquely determined, whereas 
they can only be probabilistic from the perspective of any given universe. 
 
Equally, of course, there are facts about the multiverse that cannot be deduced from 
within the multiverse itself.  An example is the mass of the electron and the 
corresponding value of the Higgs field: these are apparently not provable using the 
quantum rules of our multiverse and yet they are clearly truths.  However, in the 
eternal-inflation model [24], [25], our multiverse (regarded as our universe in the 
eternal-inflation model because quantum effects were not themselves attributed to a 
multiverse) is but one of an infinite multitude, in each one of which the Higgs field 
may take a different value. 
 
Just as quantum effects within our own universe may be explained by additional 
quantum axioms at the level of our multiverse, these different values for the Higgs 
field may again be seen as being determined at a yet higher level where further 
axioms generate the process of eternal inflation and the production of a multitude of 
multiverses (one of which is our own). 
 
7. Mathematical structure of the Plexus 
 
In the light of this, we can no longer refer to the multiverse when we mean the 
complete mathematical structure, which must extend beyond our own multiverse.  
Instead, I shall use the word Plexus for the complete structure, capitalized in the same 
spirit as we capitalize the “Earth” and the “Sun”.  Of course, our understanding of the 
detailed structure of the Plexus is subject to change – for instance, a new theory may 
supersede eternal inflation – but the basic concept of the Plexus as a hierarchy of 
levels emerging from Gödelian considerations is likely to be more robust. 
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Figure 5 illustrates this hierarchy with the number of axioms increasing in the 
upwards direction.  In this figure, the block universe at the lowest level refers to the 
whole cosmos, and is not limited to the observable universe.  At this level, axioms 
define the geometry of the block universe, and will presumably contain the Einstein 
field equations (appropriately digitized as discussed above [17]).  Unexplained events 
in the block universe are determined at a higher level by additional axioms that 
generate parallel block universes with events distributed according to quantum rules.  
At a higher level still, further axioms describe a multitude of such multiverses, 
accounting for different constants of nature.  The ascending spiral of additional 
axioms terminates, according to Gödel, in the transfinite, although this permits the 
self-reference that Tegmark wanted to avoid.  Clearly, Figure 5 is very schematic, 
and, for instance, the levels of the multiverse and the “multitude” could be swapped. 
 
multiverse of parallel universes 
arises from additional axioms, 
accounting for quantum events
unexplained constants of nature
unexplained quantum event
block universe (includes space beyond our observable universe)
multitude of multiverses 
arises from additional axioms, 
allowing different constants of 
nature in each multiverse 
(eternal inflation?)
finite and transfinite 
axioms
self reference The Plexus 
axioms
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l 
a
x
io
m
s
axioms define 
dimensional structure of 
block universe
 
 
 
Figure 5: Schematic of the Plexus.  Quantum events in our block universe are 
determined along with those in parallel block universes by additional axioms at 
the multiverse level.  Further axioms at a yet higher level define a multitude of 
multiverses like our own.  The ascending spiral of axioms eventually terminates 
in the transfinite, which permits self-reference. 
 
8. I compute, therefore I am 
 
It can be difficult to accept the idea that we are purely a mathematical structure.  How 
could a piece of mathematics be aware of itself?  To try to answer this, consider the 
mathematical structure in Figure 6. 
 
While this is a relatively simple structure, we might be more comfortable thinking of 
it – through dimensional chauvinism on our part – as a set of matrices defined by 
spatial coordinates p and q and which are stacked in the vertical direction, h.  The 
cells in the matrices are either 1 or 0, which we can think of as “live” or “dead” 
respectively.  If we regard h as the time dimension, then the matrices could be 
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displayed sequentially on a computer screen, starting at the bottom with the initial, 
given state, State(p,q,0), and moving upwards in the direction of increasing h (i.e. 
increasing time). 
 
If we program our computer to display this structure sequentially, then, depending 
upon the configuration of the initial state, we see cells being born and dying, groups 
of cells scuttling across the screen, bouncing off or annihilating each other and 
generally giving the impression of a world bustling with life.  In fact, this is John 
Conway’s Game of Life, described by Martin Gardner [26], who spells out simple 
rules governing whether cells live or die on the next move, depending upon the 
number of live cells next to them.  Remarkably, it is possible to design Turing 
Machines within the Game of Life, a feat accomplished by Paul Rendell in 2000 [27], 
following it up a decade later with a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) [28]. 
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Figure 6: This relatively simple mathematical structure is sufficient to describe 
a viable toy universe. 
 
 
It is important to keep in mind that displaying and running the Game of Life 
sequentially, frame after frame, is only a convenience for ourselves – the computer 
program is isomorphic to the static mathematical structure in Figure 6. 
 
Suppose that we run a Game of Life featuring two UTMs – one called UTM and the 
other embedded in a creature called Ant-1.  This creature can, in principle, detect 
features of its environment, for example, by sending out groups of radar cells (called 
“gliders”, discovered by Richard Guy in 1970) and can, through its internal UTM, 
build a model of its environment.  Now let us program UTM to run a second Game of 
Life, “Game of Life 2” featuring a second Ant, called Ant-2 (see Figures 7 & 8). 
 
We can see Ant-1 on our computer screen beside UTM.  Looking closely into the 
UTM we can even see the individual gliders and other automata buzzing around as 
time progresses on the computer.  However, we have not programmed a computer to 
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show Ant-2 in the Game of Life 2, and so this is represented schematically in Figure 8 
by a thought-bubble. 
 
 
State (p,q,0) for 
constructing bottom 
matrix of “Game of Life 2”
input data for 
UTM stack
…
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
UTM
Calculate N (p,q,h)
Calculate State (p,q,h+1)
For all p,q:2
3
h = 01
h = h + 1
4 Go to 2
Using Figure 6:
“Game of Life 2”
program for 
UTM stack
1500 cells wide
 
 
 
Figure 7:  The UTM in the Game of Life is approximately 1,500 cells wide and 
is serviced by two stacks, one containing a program and the other containing 
data for the program to process. 
 
 
UTM
Game of Life 2
Game of Life 1
program for 
“Game of Life 2”
data for bottom matrix 
of “Game of Life 2”
Ant 1
Ant 2
 
 
 
Figure 8:  The Game of Life 2 is shown as a thought-bubble because it is not 
actually displayed on a computer screen in the way that Game of Life 1 is. 
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When Ant-1 builds the model of its environment, this can include features of itself 
(although, of course, the model will be incomplete for Gödel/Turing-type reasons).  
To that extent, Ant-1 may be said to be self-aware.  By the same token, since Ant-2 is 
programmed similarly to Ant-1, Ant-2 may also be said to be self-aware.  In both 
cases, this self-awareness extends to each knowing that it has a computer within itself 
– the Ants are aware that they compute.  And so, Descartes-style, both Ants conclude 
that they exist! 
 
Ant-1 will be aware that there is an Ant-2 embedded within the program and input 
data contained in UTM’s stacks.  Given a little licence, we can even imagine Ant-1 
being smug about the fact that Ant-2 is not displayed on a computer screen, and so 
Ant-1 thinks that the existence of Ant-2 is in some sense less valid than its own, 
because Ant-2 is just a mathematical structure.  The irony, of course, is that Ant-1 is, 
itself, “just” a mathematical structure – as we noted above, the computer program 
running Game of Life 1 is isomorphic to a static mathematical structure. 
 
Of course, the mathematical structure of our own universe and multiverse is more 
complex than that of the Game of Life, but we share with Ant-1 and Ant-2 the essence 
of our self-awareness and the conviction that we exist. 
 
9. Why do we exist? 
 
Why does the Plexus contain such an apparently unlikely set of axioms that combine 
to produce our own distinctive multiverse?  The answer is that the Plexus contains 
every possible mathematical structure.  Most of these are sterile.  Structures include 
cubes and spheres, sets like Mandelbrot’s, and weird and splendid universes and 
multiverses, themselves containing beautiful substructures like stars and galaxies, 
exotic crystals and spectacular arrays of colour.  In at least one of these multiverses, 
substructures exist that can gaze upon their universe and be moved by its grandeur. 
 
Does the Plexus hypothesis make falsifiable predictions?  Fundamentally, it is the 
framework – the structure – that needs to be tested, rather than quantum mechanics, of 
which the Plexus hypothesis is essentially an interpretation and with which it 
therefore ought to be compatible.  The one difference is that, since the number of 
parallel block universes in our multiverse is not infinite, quantum probabilities should 
be rational rather than real numbers, as noted above.  However, the hypothesis does 
not give a limit to the number of parallel universes, which may therefore be too great 
for experiment to distinguish between the two types of probability. 
 
Tegmark argues [20] that a key prediction of a mathematical universe hypothesis is 
that physics in the future will continue to uncover mathematical regularities in nature.  
No doubt this prediction will turn out to be right, but it is difficult to see just what 
kind of experiment could falsify it.  If, for example, it appears from a series of 
experiments that a physical system has no mathematical regularity (say, the weather), 
then, far from than falsifying the hypothesis, that very discovery will just motivate us 
to pursue the matter in the hope of uncovering regularity at a deeper level (say, the 
rules of chaos).  The discovery of such an irregular system would not be cause to 
abandon the Plexus hypothesis.  
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So, if the Plexus hypothesis has not yet yielded testable predictions apart from those 
already intrinsic to quantum mechanics (with the difference between rational and real 
probabilities being too small to detect), what, then, is its attraction?  The appeal of the 
Plexus hypothesis lies in its power to reconcile and explain two extraordinary 
observations about our universe: (1) part of your future is already my past, if I am 
moving towards you and (2) quantum entanglement experiments show that the 
universe is non-local. 
 
The Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics comes close to accounting for 
the second observation, but it is nevertheless ruled out on several counts, the most 
important of which is the first of the above two observations.  This observation means 
that the outcome of any quantum experiment in the universe is unique in that 
universe’s future, which excludes the branching topology of the Many-Worlds 
picture.  This was the motivation for postulating a multiverse of complete, stand-
alone, parallel block universes. 
 
In addition to this reconciliation of the two observations, explanations for other 
phenomena now emerge “for free”.   In particular, the real origin of the “arrow of 
time”, conventionally associated with increasing entropy in our universe, arises from 
considering information across the whole multiverse.  An individual universe (one 
without a gravitational force) could even be at a moment of maximal entropy, so that 
quantum fluctuations subsequent to that moment would not increase the entropy, with 
no consequent direction for time.  However, while the random pattern at the moment 
of maximal entropy is initially repeated identically across the whole group of parallel 
universes with the same history, the pattern is generally different in each of the 
parallel universes at a later time, which  therefore takes more information to describe.  
So it is the multiverse view that gives the arrow of time its direction.  This same 
perspective also explains why time-symmetric quantum formulae are nevertheless 
consistent with time having a direction. 
 
The Plexus hypothesis raises more questions than it answers.  How might the 
equations of quantum and relativity be recast in terms of natural numbers as required 
by the hypothesis?  What might be the quantum wave function at the end of time (as 
time is necessarily finite for the same reason that the number of parallel, block 
universes is finite)?  Is the phenomenon of self-awareness a feature of only the lowest 
levels of the Plexus (individual parallel universes) or might consciousness exist at 
multiverse levels or even higher? 
 
In contrast to the soothsayers who arise every generation to prognosticate the end of 
physics, we are now aware of more questions to be answered about our universe than 
ever before in our history.  The Plexus offers up a trove of new horizons to explore in 
a quest the end of which humankind may well never reach. 
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